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 No. 13-3204 
 ___________ 
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        Appellant 
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 UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-00801) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Mark R. Hornak 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 9, 2013 
 Before:  FUENTES, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 








 Frederick Wagner appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, which dismissed with prejudice his filing, construed as 
a civil rights complaint.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 Wagner alleges that he was employed by Sears for three months in 2011 but left 
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when his hours were reduced substantially.  Wagner filed for unemployment 
compensation but was denied benefits.  Wagner appealed to the Unemployment 
Compensation Board of Review (“UCBR”), the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 
and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but was unsuccessful at each step.  Wagner then 
filed a document in the District Court entitled, “Rule 60 Motion for Relief From 
Judgement,” and subtitled “Complaint.”  In it, he sought “Relief From a Judgement 
entered by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,” and asked that the District Court 
“reverse the UCBR’s order.”  The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), concluding that the filing, “treated as a Complaint, 
fails to plausibly state a claim for relief in this Court, that this Court lacks jurisdiction to 
adjudicate his claims to the extent they seek (explicitly or implicitly) the review or 
rejection of the decisions or judgments of the Pennsylvania state courts, and that such 
flaws are fatal to the Plaintiff’s claims, now or after any possible amendment.” 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over a District Court’s decision to dismiss a complaint under § 1915(e)(2).  See 
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  Under that standard, which 
is the same standard we apply to a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), “[w]e accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw all 
reasonable inferences in [Wagner’s] favor.”  Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of New Jersey, 588 
F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting McGovern v. Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 
115 (3d Cir. 2009)).  “The District Court’s judgment is proper only if, accepting all 
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factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to 
[Wagner], we determine that [he] is not entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of 
the complaint.”  McGovern, 554 F.3d at 115.  Further, we may affirm on any grounds 
supported by the record.  See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 We agree with the District Court that lower federal courts lack subject matter 
jurisdiction to engage in direct appellate review of state court determinations under the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Dist. of Columbia Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 
(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).  There are four requirements 
that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply:  (1) the federal plaintiff lost 
in state court; (2) he is “complaining of injuries caused by [a] state-court judgment”; (3) 
the judgment was “rendered before the district court proceedings commenced”; and 
(4) the plaintiff is “inviting district court review and rejection of [that] judgment.”  Gary 
v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).  Here, Wagner lost in state court 
before filing his federal action, the injuries of which he complains were caused by the 
state court judgments in question, and his request for relief specifically included 
invalidation of the state courts’ rulings as to that claim.  Thus, to the extent he sought 
direct review of the state courts’ rulings, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to 
accommodate him.    
 Wagner argues in his brief that the District Court had jurisdiction because his 
complaint stated that it arose “under the rule of law 18 U.S.C.1623 where employer HR 
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manager deceived the UC Referee by material falsification under oath.”  To the extent 
Wagner was attempting to raise an independent violation of a constitutional or statutory 
federal right, it may not have been barred by Rooker-Feldman.  Great W. Mining & 
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 172-73 (3d Cir. 2010).  However, the 
claim is without merit, as § 1623 applies by its terms to false declarations made in 
federal, not state, courts.  Further, § 1623 is a criminal statute that does not expressly give 
rise to a private cause of action.  Cf. Luckett v. Bure, 290 F.3d 493, 497 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(perjury is a crime that does not give rise to civil cause of action).   
 A plaintiff should be granted the opportunity to amend his complaint unless 
amendment would be inequitable or futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 
F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002).  Here, there are no facts suggesting a violation of Wagner’s 
federal or constitutional rights.  Accordingly, we conclude that it would have been futile 
for the District Court to provide him with leave to amend his complaint before dismissal.  
As dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) was appropriate, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court.  
